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Abstract—This position paper proposes new challenges in
data-centric misbehavior detection for vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs). In VANETs, which aim to improve safety and
efficiency of road transportation by enabling communication
between vehicles, an important challenge is how vehicles can
be certain that messages they receive are correct. Incorrectness
of messages may be caused by malicious participants, damaged
sensors, delayed messages or they may be triggered by software
bugs. An essential point is that due to the wide deployment
in these networks, we cannot assume that all vehicles will
behave correctly. This effect is stronger due to the privacy
requirements, as those requirements include multiple certificates
per vehicle to hide its identity. To detect these incorrect messages,
the research community has developed misbehavior data-centric
detection mechanisms, which attempt to recognize the messages
by semantically analyzing the content. The detection of anomalous
messages can be used to detect and eventually revoke the
certificate of the sender, if the message was malicious. However,
this approach is made difficult by rare events –such as accidents–,
which are essentially anomalous messages that may trigger the
detection mechanisms. The idea we wish to explore in this paper
is how attack detection may be improved by also considering the
detection of specific types of anomalous events, such as accidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of the development of vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) is to improve both safety and efficiency
of road transportation. Although applications in the near future
are designed with drivers in mind, it is conceivable that
VANETs will be combined with recent developments on auto-
mated driving in the future. For this reason, it is especially im-
portant that we develop a secure communication platform from
the ground up. Another important aspect is user-acceptance,
which will deteriorate if the system reports incorrect warnings.
Developments of these security mechanisms have required
several innovations from the security community, especially
in order to deal with the new challenges that VANETs pose.
Notably, these challenges include the strict privacy require-
ments, bandwidth constraints, the ephemeral nature of the
network, lack of permanent access to infrastructure and the
public nature of the messages that are exchanged. We refer the
interested reader to [1] for a more detailed discussion of these
challenges. In summary, it has become clear that pro-active
security mechanisms like digital signatures are not sufficient
to provide security in VANETs; the research community has
proposed complementary reactive security mechanisms, which
detect malicious messages even when they are authentic. This
process is also known as misbehavior detection.
Over the past decade, many security mechanisms for de-
tecting misbehavior have been developed. These can be clas-
sified as either data- or node-centric, representing a focus the
correctness of the content or the trust in a network participant
respectively. A deeper classification and its applications to
other types of networks can be found in [2].
During our study of the literature, we have observed that
the evaluation of these mechanisms is typically performed
against normal/baseline behavior and that same scenario con-
taining one or more attacker. In this paper, we will focus on
data-centric mechanisms that look at the data alone; good
examples of these mechanisms include those proposed by
Leinmu¨ller et al. [3]; among other mechanisms, they describe
the detection of unrealistic speeds, e.g. a claimed speed of
500km/h. One might imagine a similar detection mechanism
could be used for sudden speed drops, but this could lead
to problems: a crashing vehicle may also portray an unusual
pattern (e.g., a very sharp drop in speed). Clearly we cannot
classify a crashing vehicle as a malicious one. This illustrates
that for data-centric misbehavior detection mechanisms, an
important open issue is that we cannot automatically classify
anomalous data as being malicious.
Partially in response to this issue, several authors have
proposed a new class of data-centric detection mechanisms,
which use the driver’s response as a model for correctness [4],
[5]. The idea is that a driver will correctly react to scenarios
such as an accident, even when all detection mechanisms
fail. These mechanisms can be used to eventually expel the
malicious senders from the network. This can significantly
reduce the impact of attackers and damaged sensors, but it
does not prevent the spread of malicious or incorrect messages
throughout the network until the driver should already have
responded to the event. This is undesirable from a user-
perspective: if the driver receives potentially false warnings all
the time, the user acceptance of the applications will go down,
or the users may simply turn the system off. Therefore, we
identify a need to combine both approaches; we need detection
mechanisms that use the driver’s behavior as a baseline, as
well as detection mechanisms that prevent malicious messages
before they arrive.
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss two open issues
regarding data-centric misbehavior detection: the similarity
with the detection of events, such as a crashing vehicle, and the
evaluation of misbehavior detection. Before discussing these
open issues, we discuss how multiple misbehavior detection
mechanisms can be combined into a framework, and we
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elaborate on the state of our current research. Our research
set out to improve detection accuracy, and as we discuss the
open issues we will elaborate how our framework may help
solve them.
II. FRAMEWORKS FOR MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION
In the literature, several authors have already observed this
challenge and proposed the combination of several different
mechanisms [3], as well as frameworks that allow more com-
plex operations [6], [7]. Specifically, Golle et al. [7] discussed
techniques to decide which conclusion is most likely based on
a set of received messages. On the other hand, Raya et al. [6]
and other authors have discussed the more abstract idea of
trust between participants in the network. The idea of their
work is to use node- and data-centric information to provide
a trust value for each participant. This trust value is then used
to predict the likelihood that a message is incorrect.
In our ongoing research, we are developing a framework
to unify the detection of misbehavior in VANETs. Using
subjective logic [8], we build a modular system that can
incorporate arbitrary amounts of detection mechanisms and
usefully combine their results. The goal is to provide filtering
of malicious messages, the exchange of evidence between
nodes and the tools for local or global revocation. Although
the specific advantages of our framework are beyond the scope
of this paper, a core focus for us is the idea that different
mechanisms may perform poorly or very well depending on
the specific scenario. In order to cope with this, we keep the
results from multiple mechanisms, and allow the expression
of uncertainty about a result (for which subjective logic is
our chosen mathematical representation). However, we realized
that because a mechanisms’ (un)certainty about a result may
depend on the context in which it is running; is it designed for
highway or urban scenarios? Is there a connection available to
a back-end system or certificate authority?
III. COMBINING SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY
We have previously noted that there is a significant parallel
between data-centric misbehavior detection and the recognition
of legitimate events that vehicles should notify their drivers
about. In particular, we note that pure data-centric misbehavior
detection is very hard especially for this reason: a sufficiently
powerful attacker will always attempt to imitate a legitimate
event as precise as possible. On the other hand, the detection
of legitimate events is challenging because sensor data may not
be reliable, or have a significant margin of error. We propose
that these mechanisms can complement each other.
Specifically, this position paper proposes the idea that
our framework can facilitate the mechanisms by providing
the appropriate context based on the history. This history,
or the trustworthy subset there-of, can be provided to a
mechanism that is designed to recognize a particular scenario
– for example, a crashing vehicle. Moreover, this process
could be triggered by detection mechanisms, which typically
detect such anomalous events. An approach for this process is
illustrated in Figure 1. This figure shows an arriving message
(1), which triggers a misbehavior detection mechanism to
detect an anomaly (2). This allows the situation recognition
to create a context (3). This context can be used to update
framework
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Fig. 1. This figure shows how our framework might detect and adapt to a
legitimate anomalous event.
the detection mechanism (4), or it can be used to modify the
opinion directly. The opinion can then be stored (5a), and
if necessary, a reaction can be processed (5b). In practice,
this means that a single misbehavior detection mechanism
may detect a sudden drop in speed, which it recognizes as a
potential attack. Instead of discarding the message, or marking
it as untrustworthy, the message and associated history is first
passed through a mechanism that searches for a specific pattern
–in this example, it could be a crash on a highway (the highway
is the context in this case). Because this mechanism identifies
the message as part of a crash, the framework updates the trust
values towards higher uncertainty.
We propose that our framework extensions may be applied
to decouple the development of event detection mechanisms
for the different settings (e.g., highway or urban), as well
as the specific events that are to be detected (e.g., traffic
jams or crashing vehicles). By describing the individual events
for specific settings, a much clearer and more accurate event
detection mechanism can be developed, which allows for more
certainty regarding the correctness of the misbehavior detection
mechanisms. In addition, it allows us to avoid significant
pitfalls during detection (of both attackers and events) caused
by the attacker producing messages that relate to settings that
are distinct from the actual situation. We can decouple the cor-
rect recognition of a scenario from validating the misbehavior
detection mechanism, which reduces the required simulation
time and the effort required to design the simulations. Ideally,
this decoupling could even allow a formal proof for individual
components, which makes the analysis stronger.
IV. EXAMPLES
We now present two brief examples to motivate the decou-
pling of event and attack detection. Consider an urban setting,
with three vehicles driving on a road at about 50km/h. Just
before a small side-street, the second vehicle breaks hard to
be able to turn into the street. This sudden drop in speed
will be accompanied by a break warning DEMN, and may be
considered anomalous (i.e., suspicious) by several misbehavior
detection mechanisms, due to the absence of an accident.
Nevertheless, it is intuitively clear that this is not misbehavior,
but rather poor driving, because the driver braked too late.
Similarly, consider a highway in a dense forest, where
three vehicles driving behind each other, with an average
speed of around 120km/h. In this situation, the first vehicle
performs a hard break because it detected a stray animal on
the road. Again, the sudden break warning may trigger a
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misbehavior detection mechanism in the following vehicles to
detect misbehavior, until they detect the animal.
In both cases, the context (the side street and the dense
forest, respectively) provides an additional explanation for
the detected event that might otherwise have identified the
sending vehicle as malicious. Similarly, attack detection may
be improved by this decoupling, as it allows the detection of
attacks that imitate the incorrect context. For example, when an
attacker attempts to create a high-speed crash scenario based
on a highway setting in an urban one, we can detect that the
sequence of messages does not match the twists and turns of
the road. In addition, the approach simplifies the development
of misbehavior detection mechanisms, because they no longer
need to provide a generic mechanism capturing all possible
scenarios, but rather can be designed to deal with specific
scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we have proposed several ideas
on how to improve data-centric misbehavior detection in
VANETs. We have briefly discussed existing work, including
approaches that attempt to provide a framework for general
misbehavior detection, and we have pointed out several open
issues. We have then proposed several ideas that can be used to
improve data-centric misbehavior detection and its evaluation,
which we hope provide the material for an exciting discussion
of the topic during the Fachgespra¨ch.
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